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Neoliberalism and the Far-Right: A Contradictory 
Embrace 
Neil Davidson (University of Glasgow) & Rick Saull (Queen Mary, University of London) 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the contradictory relationship between the political economy of 
neoliberalism and the politics of the far-right. It seeks to identify and explain the 
divergence of the ‘economic’ and the social/cultural spheres under neoliberalism (notably 
in articulations of race and class and the ‘politics of whiteness’) and how such 
developments play out in the politics of the contemporary far-right. Through this we also 
seek to examine the degree to which the politics of the far-right pose problems for the 
consolidation and long-term stabilization of neoliberalism as a social regime of capital, 
through acting as a populist source of pressure on the conservative-right and tapping into 
sources of alienation amongst declassé social layers. Finally, we locate the politics of the 
far-right within the broader atrophying of political representation and accountability of the 
neoliberal era with respect to the institutional and legal organization of neoliberalism at the 
regional and international levels, as most obviously highlighted in the ongoing crisis of the 
EU and Eurozone. 
 
*** 
 
Introduction 
As the hegemonic form of political economy, neoliberalism has been articulated via a number 
of political vernaculars and agents, encompassing both the centre-left and centre/right. In 
consequence, it has come to fundamentally reshape the terrain upon which socio-economic 
issues and politics are debated and understood across the world; it has engendered new forms 
of ‘common sense’ associated with new parameters and limitations of politics, and the 
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possibilities associated with democratic political deliberation and decision-making (Brown, 
2015; Duggan, 2003; Mair, 2013; Streeck, 2014). Our concerns here are with the particular 
relationship between an increasingly crisis-ridden neoliberal capitalism and the politics of the 
far-right.  
  
Our spatial focus is relatively narrow. As Bob Jessop has pointed out, neoliberalism has 
always been characterised by spatial differentiation in which several varieties operated 
simultaneously. His typology involves four geographically demarcated moments, each 
reflecting the structured inequality of the global capitalist system. Two of these forms can be 
found in the developed capitalisms of the West. The first involve neoliberal regime shifts, 
above all in the English-speaking world, where the institutional characteristics of the Great 
Boom–Social or Liberal Democracy in politics, Keynesianism in economic management, and 
Fordism in industrial organisation–were replaced during the dominance of parties committed 
to destroying the post-war settlement. The second involve neoliberal policy adjustments, for 
example in the Scandinavian and Rhenish countries, where partial adaptations to 
neoliberalism were made while retaining some elements from the former period. The third 
involve neoliberal system transformation in the former Stalinist states of Russia and Easter 
Europe, and to a lesser extent in South-East Asia, where the existing state capitalist 
economies were transformed with varying degrees of abruptness into particularly extreme 
versions of the Western multinational capitalist model. The fourth involves neoliberal 
structural adjustment programmes in the Global South, which are essentially an aspect of 
contemporary imperialism as exercised by Western-dominated transnational institutions like 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Jessop 2010: 172-174).  
In what follows we are primarily concerned with the first moment of ‘neoliberal regime 
shift’ and therefore draw mainly on the experience of the UK and, to a lesser extent, the USA. 
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This is not because events in any of these states have chronological priority, although the 
components of the neoliberal order were first assembled into a coherent package in Britain; 
but many had been introduced elsewhere before Margaret Thatcher had taken office, across 
all of the areas covered by Jessop’s typology of forms, from New York City in the First 
World (1975), to China in what was then the Second (1978), and to Chile (1973) and Jamaica 
(1976) in the Third. The reason why any overview of the neoliberal experiment has to focus 
on the twin metropolitan heartlands is rather that understanding neoliberalism, like 
understanding any significant social phenomenon, can best be achieved by focussing on its 
most developed forms: ‘Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape’, as Marx 
put it (Marx 1973: .105; see also Marx 1976: 90) These forms are not necessarily the most 
typical of the phenomenon, nor in the case of neoliberalism do they necessarily reveal the 
future pattern of development elsewhere in the world, since it has reinforced rather than 
undermined the inherent unevenness of capitalism; but subjecting them to scrutiny can 
perhaps reveal the essence of what we wish to understand.   
The neoliberal redrawing of the political, both as a social space for collective and 
democratic deliberation and the imaginaries derived from and promoted by that space, has 
helped to create important and historically unique opportunities for the far-right. In this 
context the far right articulates  angry, resentful grievances across a range of social layers in 
response to the transformations, instabilities and dislocations of neoliberalism, what some 
have labelled the ‘politics of the left-behinds’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Our focus on 
neoliberalism in the UK and USA means that we are primarily concerned with the non-fascist 
wing of the far-right here, although we will refer for illustrative purposes to some examples 
of far-right activity in member-states of the European Union. (The question of why fascist 
variants of the far-right have tended to emerge in states subject to Jessop’s neoliberal regime 
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shifts, like Austria, or neoliberal system transformations, like Hungary, is important, but 
impossible to discuss adequately here.)   
Our central point is that there is a contradiction, or at the very least, a tension, between 
neoliberalism as a form of capitalist organisation, and some of the policies advocated by far-
right organisations and desired by their members. As this suggests, although our analysis is 
conducted within a Marxist framework, we reject Marxist analysis which treats the far-right 
as the “real” face of capitalism unmasked. In fact, in the developed world at least, it is only in 
very rare situations of dire extremity–and usually after facing the kind of threat from the 
labour movement that has been absent for several decades–that capital has ever relied on the 
far right to solve its problems. UKIP, like the Tea Party in the USA, is capital’s 
Frankenstein’s monster, an unintended consequence of the unresolvable social tensions 
thrown up by the neoliberal order. UKIP has given a focus to a range of concerns in the shape 
of a quasi-imaginary institution called the “Brussels”, in a similar way that the Tea Party did 
in the shape of another quasi-imaginary institution called “the Government”; the main 
difference is that in the case of the former, the institution is foreign, rather than domestic, the 
crime of local elites being their compliance with it. The basis of at least part of its popular 
support is, however, drawn from a comparable constituency. It is the resultant tensions within 
capital that we seek to explore here. 
 
The Roots of a Contradiction  
For some authors, far-right positions are simply a constitutive part of neoliberal dominance. 
In his discussion of ‘the politics of resentment’ in the USA, for example, Jeremy Engels 
claims that ‘wedge issues’ like abortion and gay marriage are ‘as much a part of 
neoliberalism in the United States as the rhetoric of efficiency, deregulation, and free trade’ 
(Engels, 2015: 124-5). But not every action taken by supporters of capitalism is necessarily 
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beneficial to the operation of that system, including the political rhetoric to which Engels 
refers. Contrary to extreme functionalist or economic determinist positions, representatives of 
the dominant classes are not infallible or all-knowing. As Gramsci once noted, we have to 
allow for the possibility of error, but ‘error’ is not reducible to a ‘mistake’: ‘The principle of 
“error” is a complex one: one may be dealing with an individual impulse based on mistaken 
calculations or equally it may be a manifestation of the attempts of specific groups or sects to 
take over hegemony within the directive grouping, attempts which may well be unsuccessful’ 
(Gramsci 1971: 408, Q7§24). In what follows we will treat the far-right as an example of a 
‘specific group or sect’, but any attempt to establish the contradictions between it and 
neoliberalism has to begin by establishing what these terms mean.  
 Neoliberalism can be sensibly used to describe three different things. First, an 
ideology which emerged in Central Europe during the 1930s in opposition to what its 
adherents called socialism (i.e. state planning and ownership) and which later migrated to the 
Economics Department at the University of Chicago. Second, a strategy adopted by the 
alliance of state managers, politicians and employers which began to emerge from the mid- to 
late-1970s, first in the UK, USA and Chile, in response to the return of economic crisis. It 
certainly sought to transfer power in the workplace from the forces of labour to the holders of 
capital, in the first instance by weakening the trade unions; but this was not the 
implementation of a master plan derived from neoliberalism-as-an-ideology. Once 
Keynesianism and other forms of state capitalism had been rejected by Western ruling classes 
as inadequate, they were left with a limited set of options. It is therefore unsurprising that 
most arrived at the same responses. Finally, neoliberalism is the entire era in the history of 
capitalism which spans the period since this strategy began to be applied. It was not 
inevitable that the post-1973 era would have this character: there were moments in most 
major countries, when different outcomes were possible. By the late-1980s, however, a new 
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settlement weighted in favour of capital had clearly been achieved in the UK and the USA.  
Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, this did not involve the decline of the interventionist 
state and the rise of the free market. ‘Neoliberalism rejected the state of the social democratic 
compromise, not the state in general’ ((Duménil and Lévy 2011: 88). Indeed, in some 
respects states under neoliberalism have accrued even more power to themselves than they 
did during the Keynesian era. The measures of nationalisation and state control in response to 
the present crisis are therefore not a return to state interventionism, since it has never ceased. 
Indeed, even though the neoclassical and neoliberal schools both see an important role for 
states – enabling market activity on the one hand, disabling collective opposition on the other 
– their actual role in direct economic terms has gone much further than either theoretical 
tradition allows. The process has been one of ‘reorientation rather than decline’ (Dunn 2009: 
29).  
 Where the neoliberal strategy was successful, it allowed corporate restructuring, the 
closing of ‘unproductive’ units and the imposition of ‘the right of managers to manage’ 
within the workplace, which in turn ensured that wage costs fell and stayed down, so that the 
share of profits going to capital was increased. It also opened up the possibility of three 
longer-term developments.. The first was to increase the probability that, when economic 
growth was resumed, working class organisation would not be in a position to take advantage 
of increased profit rates by pushing for higher wages and better conditions: in other words, 
that any future boom would primarily benefit capital not labour. In Britain trade union 
density in 1979 was 55.4%; by 1983, 47.6%; by 1987, 43.4%; by 1992, 36.3%; and by 1997, 
29.9% (McIlroy 2009: 27, 37). The second was that, while forcing wage levels to remain 
stagnant or decline in real terms was desired outcome in one respect, it caused difficulties in 
another, namely restricted or falling levels of consumer expenditure: the answer was to create 
hitherto-unknown levels of working class debt. The third was to assist the social and liberal 
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democratic parties to adapt to neoliberalism by weakening the main source of countervailing 
pressure from the broader labour movement, thus ensuring that fiscal and other changes 
favourable of capital would not be reversed. ‘Neoliberals aimed to develop a thoroughgoing 
re-education programme for all parties to alter the tenor and meaning of political life: nothing 
more, nothing less’ (Mirowski 2009, 431) 
The successful onslaught on the labour movement by the vanguard regimes allowed all the 
other components of the neoliberal repertoire that Chris Harman calls ‘anti-reforms’ to be 
implemented (Harman 2008: 118). Some of these proved to be either irrelevant in practical 
terms or of a purely temporary significance and are now seen as intellectual curiosities. For 
example, monetarism, or governmental control of the money supply, was never seriously 
adopted by any state, least of all by the USA, which maintained an impressive record of 
deficit financing from the mid-1960s onwards that actually peaked during the vanguard 
neoliberal presidencies of Reagan and Bush the Elder. And in Britain, as Daniel Rodgers 
writes: ‘Monetarism turned out to be a bulldozer that could raze a building but could not erect 
one’ (Rodgers 2011, 55)  Any catalogue of those policies which proved more enduring would 
have to include the following, although the following list is by no means exhaustive: 
privatisation of state-owned industries and utilities, flexible labour markets, outsourcing of 
non-core functions, deregulation of financial markets and the removal of exchange controls, 
the abolition of protective tariffs and subsidies on essential goods, commodification of 
services once provided free at the point of use, the shift from direct and progressive to 
indirect and regressive taxation, and a monetary policy dedicated to the maintenance of low 
levels of inflation. But neoliberalism as a system incorporating these elements only emerged 
in a piecemeal fashion, after many false starts, accidental discoveries, opportunistic 
manoeuvres and unintended consequences. We can summarise all these developments by 
saying that together, they constitute the current mode of organisation of the capitalist system. 
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 The contemporary far-right occupies a spectrum or continuum ranging from fascism 
at one end to extreme conservatism on the other. In other words, the span of positions 
between the British National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) in Britain, or between the American Nazi Party and ‘Tea Party currents’ within the 
Republican Party in the United States; but in our view, all wings of the far-right are  united 
by two defining characteristics, whatever other differences there may be between them. One 
is a base of membership and support in one or more fraction of the middle-class (i.e. the petty 
bourgeoisie, traditional middle-class professionals or the technical-managerial new middle 
class), although, as we shall see, this does not mean that they necessarily lack working-class 
support. The other is an attitude of extreme social conservatism, always in relation to race 
and nation, and in most instances in relation to gender and sexual orientation: far-right 
politicians in the Netherlands, for example, have rhetorically invoked the relative freedoms of 
women or gays in the West as way of denouncing the supposedly oppressive beliefs of 
Muslims. The political goal is always to push popular attitudes and legal rights back to a time 
before the homogeneity of ‘the people’ was polluted by immigration, whenever this Golden 
Age of racial or cultural purity is deemed to have existed, which is usually at some 
undetermined period before the Second World War.    
 There are nevertheless large differences between these two types of organization. 
Michael Mann argues that non-fascist far-right parties are distinguished from fascism by 
three characteristics: (1) they are electoral and seek to attain office through democratic means 
at local, national and European levels; (2) they do not ‘worship the state’ and, while they seek 
to use the state for welfare purposes for their client groups, some (e.g. the Austrian Freedom, 
the Swiss People’s Party and/or the Tea Party) have embraced neoliberal small-state rhetoric; 
and (3) they do not seek to ‘transcend’ class (Mann, 2004: 367-368). The first of these 
distinctions, adherence to liberal democracy, is crucial since it indicates the fundamental 
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distinction between the fascist and non-fascist far-right: the latter, as Peter Mair notes, ‘do not 
claim to challenge the democratic regime as such’ (Mair 2013: 45). Activists and 
commentators often draw an absolute distinction between fascism and other forms of right-
wing politics, based on the way the former rely on paramilitary organization and violence as 
part of their strategy for attaining power. In that sense Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in 
Hungary resemble classic fascist formations in a way that the Northern League in Italy does 
not. The distinction is important, not least in determining the tactics of their opponents, but 
fascism is not defined simply by its recourse to extra-parliamentary or illegal activity. 
 The second distinction, which flows directly from the first, is their respective attitudes 
to society which they are trying to build. As Roger Griffin points out, the ‘revolution from the 
right’ in both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany saw both movements use the state to socially 
engineer a ‘new man and woman’ with ‘new values’ (Griffin, 2000: 198). This is a project of 
transformation. The non-fascist far-right however tends to insist that the people are already 
the repositories of homogeneity and virtue, but are besieged by ‘elites’ from above and 
‘dangerous others’ from below. The purpose of the non-fascist far-right is to return the people 
to their formerly happy condition before these twin pressures began to be applied (Albertazzi 
and McDonnell, 2008: 5). This is a project of restoration.  
 It is in the non-revolutionary, restoration politics of the far-right where the 
contradiction with neoliberalism lies. Until the neoliberal era, the far-right of whatever wing 
tended to adapt to whatever the dominant organizational forms of capital was at that 
particular time. Between 1929 and 1973, for example, right-wing military dictatorships in 
Latin America–historically the most common type of far-right regime–were as committed, in 
many respects, to state-led interventionist strategies for development as nominally left-wing 
postcolonial regimes in Africa and the Middle East: Brazil is a case in point, particularly 
between 1964 and 1968 (Oliviera, 2003: 45). In the later case of Chile, however, the military 
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junta initially had little idea what economic policies to introduce and, in an earlier period, 
might well have looked to the Catholic Corporatist model introduced by Franco to Spain after 
1939, which had been followed more-or-less faithfully by almost every Latin American 
dictatorship since the Second World War. In fact, as Karin Fischer points out, ‘it took about 
two years before the neoliberal faction ascended to positions of authority, which enabled 
technocrats to advance their far-reaching organizational program’. (Fischer, 2009: 317).  
 The Brazilian and Chilean juntas both belonged to the same genus, even if the 
brutality of the latter was greater; but they had quite different attitudes towards the role of the 
state in relation to ownership, control and regulation of the economy. But differences in far-
right economic policy are not simply reflective of the different historical periods in which 
parties, movements and regimes have arisen. Deep in the fourth decade of the neoliberal era, 
there are marked differences between the demands for less welfare and lower taxation made 
by supporters of the Tea Party or the Dutch People’s Party, which are examples of 
mainstream neoliberal thinking, and those for greater state intervention to mitigate the effects 
of globalization made by supporters of Jobbik in Hungary and Golden Dawn in Greece 
(Pelinka, 2013: 15017). It is the latter which are potentially in contradiction with the 
objectives of neoliberalism, but these parties were only able to gain popular support because, 
at the very moment neoliberalism-as-strategy triumphed in the late 1980s, it underwent a 
crucial mutation.  
 The all-out frontal attacks on the labour movement and the organized socio-political 
power of the working class that was characteristic of the ‘first stage’ of neoliberalism had 
largely ceased by the late 1980s. The transition from what Davidson (2010: 31-54) calls 
‘vanguard’ regimes of reorientation to ‘social’ regimes of consolidation–from Thatcher and 
Reagan to Blair and Clinton–therefore involved moving from what Gramsci called a war of 
manoeuvre to a war of position. The first involved a frontal onslaught on the labour 
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movement and the dismantling of formerly embedded Social Democratic institutions (‘roll-
back’); the second, a more molecular process involving the gradual commodification of huge 
new areas of social life, and the creation of new institutions specifically constructed on 
neoliberal principles (‘roll-out’) (Gramsci 1971: 229-239; Law 2009: paragraphs 2.2, 2.4-2.6; 
Peck and Tickell, 2002: 40-45). Although these versions of neoliberalism appeared 
sequentially, they are now available as alternative approaches to governance, setting the 
limits of conventional politics in our time. 
 For all practical purposes therefore, members of ruling classes across the West and 
political parties of both centre-left and centre right are united in accepting neoliberalism as 
the only viable way of organizing capitalism as an economic system; but they are divided in 
relation to how capitalism should be organized as a social system. Consequently there are 
real divisions of opinion between them concerning, for example, gay rights, environmental 
protection or – of particular concern to this article – anti-racism.  
 Support for individual rights and freedoms constitute the main difference between 
‘vanguard’ and ‘social neoliberalism’. As we shall see in more detail in the next section, 
however, many of the claims of social neoliberalism to oppose racism are largely formal and 
its policies have, in many respects, served to increase and compound the pathology of racism. 
But even if we take the rhetoric seriously, its impact has been mainly beneficial to the middle 
classes. As Walter Benn Michaels wrote in the wake of Obama’s victory over Hilary Clinton 
to become the Democratic Party Presidential candidate; this was a victory for neoliberalism, 
‘for a commitment to justice that has no argument with inequality as long as its beneficiaries 
are as racially and sexually diverse as its victims’. Society would remain unequal, but 
‘discrimination would play no role in administering the inequality’ (Benn Michaels, 2008: 
34). 
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 It is not only that inequality remains intact, or is increasing: the victories of 
neoliberalism have left the working class in the West increasingly fragmented and 
disorganized, and, for some workers, appeals to ‘blood and nation’ appear as the only viable 
form of collectivity still available, particularly in a context where any systemic alternative to 
capitalism had apparently collapsed in 1989-91. Individuals may not blame capitalism as a 
system or themselves as participants in the system for their personal dissatisfactions, but this 
does not mean that they have dispensed with the need to find someone or something to 
blame; but whom? If, as Thatcher pointed out in a famous interview, ‘there is no such thing 
as society’, but only a ‘living tapestry of men and women and people’ then there can be no 
such thing as social groups, social classes or, more to the point, social conflict (Thatcher 
1987). But since conflicts nevertheless continue to occur, individuals must be responsible, 
and held to account, since, as Zygmunt Bauman points out, ‘the ideology of privatisation 
assumes the presence of a culprit behind every case of suffering or discomfort, there ensues a 
feverish search for the persons guilty of debasing them’ (Bauman, 2008: 23). To explain 
this apparent discrepancy, politicians and the media have elevated two categories to the 
forefront of explanation: the Criminal and the Incompetent. These have been exemplified on 
the one hand by the armed burglar lying in wait to seize the property of the terrified readers 
of the Daily Mail, and on the other by the social worker, alternatively unjustifiably removing 
children from one family or incomprehensibly failing to rescue them from another, to the 
uncomprehending fury of readers of the Sun newspaper. In circumstances where economics 
clearly is involved, as in the current crisis, scapegoats can be found who conform to these 
stereotypes; Bernie Madoff belongs to the ranks of the former, Sir Fred Goodwin to those of 
the latter.  
 But there is also a third category: the Intruder, characteristically an asylum seeker, an 
illegal immigrant, or increasingly a legal immigrant, who have been added to the ranks of the 
13 
 
category of ‘criminal’ while being housed and ‘protected’ by the Incompetents, enslaved as 
they are to doctrines of ‘Political Correctness’. Migration is therefore a central issue here. 
And neoliberalism contributes to the revival of far-right politics through the global, structural 
changes that it has carried through over the last forty years. In particular, it is the connection 
between domestic socio-economic change, as reflected in the rescaling of welfare assistance, 
and the compulsions towards labour market flexibility, with the accompanying sense of 
individualized social insecurity for workers (Theodore, 2007: 252-3). Neoliberalism, then, 
has rested upon the opening up of labour markets within the mature capitalist economies to 
competitive pressures on the social wage through both off-shoring production sources in low 
wage zones and though encouraging migrants to enter labour markets contributing to further 
downward pressure on wages and driving up the level of exploitation. At the same time, 
neoliberal policies through the waves of structural adjustment supervised by the IMF and 
World Bank (and in the European case, the European Commission) have played an important 
role in compounding economic insecurities and inequalities within many of these countries, 
thus propelling many people to migrate to the richer zones of the core capitalist countries to 
secure their livelihoods.  
 A key element in the neoliberal formula of economic efficiency and competitive 
markets is economic migration, but this imperative sits at odds with the culturalized and 
racialized assumptions that inform those aspects of the neoliberal project concerning the 
reconfiguration of the welfare state, particularly the withdrawal of the public and democratic 
oversight of, and responses to inequalities and discrimination based on race. Immigration, 
then, contributes to the racialized spectre of citizenship rights that neoliberalism exposes 
through the underlying racist assumptions that welfare is no longer a universal right of 
citizenship but is, instead, for those who actively demonstrate that they deserve it through 
mimicking neoliberal subjectivities.  
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 Immigration, then, challenges the prevailing sense of whiteness, especially amongst 
sections of the working class. The social insecurities that increasingly pervade working 
classes are the result of the simultaneous off-shoring of traditional occupations with the 
perception (if not always the reality) of greater competition from migrants for work in their 
locales. Working class (male) whiteness has tended to be associated with employment that 
has provided a sense of social worth and a basis of citizenship that now appears to be 
disappearing, as the social contract between capital and labour mediated by the social 
democratic state that structured the post-war political economy has been dismantled (Saull, 
2015c: 145-50). Loss of work opportunities combined with increasing pressures on access to 
social and material resources takes place within an underlying ideological narrative that 
whites are ‘deserving’ of welfare and social assistance rather than non-whites, who are seen 
as culturally deficient because they supposedly do not wish to integrate and/or adopt a 
neoliberal subjectivity. This further fuels a crisis of white identity that is increasingly 
racialized through the destruction of the structures and institutions of social solidarity rooted 
in class. Thus, the class identity of many white workers in mature capitalist democracies after 
1945 was particularly connected to forms of a racialized white identity that was also 
associated with the creation of post-war welfare states that rested on racialized distinctions 
and implied social hierarchies within the working class (Omi and Winant, 2014: 161-210; 
Virdee, 2014:98-122). Consequently, in many respects then, class formation was also race 
formation. With the breakdown of the post-war racialized social democratic settlement across 
much of the West and the Anglosphere in particular since the early 1980s, the racially-
infused class identity of many white and male workers has been destabilized through both the 
off-shoring of formerly secure and well-paid jobs, employment insecurity and, also, 
‘competition’ from migrants. It is these developments that go some way in helping to explain 
the shifts in the political orientation of significant numbers of white workers from their 
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‘traditional’ political loyalties towards the social democratic left to the parties of the right and 
far-right as reflective of a crisis of white working class identity as exemplified in increasingly 
culturalized forms of social and political compensation for socio-economic disadvantage. 
And, in doing so, reflecting a new racially-charged dynamic to the class politics of such 
polities.1   
 Here is where the crisis of working class white identity has been picked up by the far-
right and deployed as the basis of an insurgent and populist, ‘anti-system’ politics. The far-
right, whilst agreeing with and contributing to neoliberal propaganda against the universalist 
welfare state, also attack the ‘elite’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ cheerleaders of neoliberalism who 
champion immigration as the means to promote labour market competition and help fuel 
economic growth. As Andy Jones has noted this has allowed politicians  such as UKIP’s 
Nigel Farrage to take on the mantle of defending British qua white workers on the basis that 
immigration is ‘good for the rich because it’s cheaper nannies and cheaper chauffeurs and 
cheaper gardeners, but it’s bad news for ordinary Britons… It has left the white working class 
effectively as an underclass and that, I think, is a disaster’ (Jones, 2014). 
 It is at this point that the far-right enters the scene with plausible-sounding answers. 
Dismissing their views on grounds of irrationality is simply an evasion. As Berlet and Lyons 
write: ‘[r]ight-wing populist claims are no more and no less irrational than conventional 
claims that presidential elections express the will of the people, that economic health can be 
measured by the profits of multimillion dollar corporations, or that US military interventions 
in Haiti or Somalia or Kosovo or wherever are designed to promote democracy and human 
rights’ (Berlet and Lyons 2000: 348). Yet these beliefs, which are accepted by many more 
people than those who believe in, say, the literal truth of the Book of Genesis, are not treated 
as signs of foolishness. The issue, as Berlet has argued elsewhere, is not ‘personal pathology’ 
but collective ‘desperation’ (Berlet 1995: 285) and this seems particularly pertinent with 
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respect to the support from significant sections of the white working class for Donald Trump 
in the Republican Primary election (Thompson, 2016).  It is more illuminating to ask how 
such movements come into existence and how far they offer false solutions to genuine 
problems. In fact, as Joe Bageant writes of the US: ‘The New Conservatism arose in the same 
way left-wing movements do, by approximately the same process, and for the same reasons: 
widespread but unacknowledged dissatisfaction, in this case with the erosion of ‘traditional’ 
life and values in America as working people perceive them’ (Bageant, 2007: 81-82). More 
generally, Paul Taggart has plausibly suggested that far-right movements do not simply 
deploy similar methods to the left in building support, but that their emergence was in some 
respects a reaction to that of the 1968 far-left (Taggart, 1996: 17-18).  
 A potential problem for the stability of the capitalist system is, then, less the 
possibility of far-right parties themselves coming to power with a program – inadvertently or 
not – destructive to capitalist needs, than these parties coming to influence the mainstream 
parties of the right (and left), to the extent that their influence over the policies of the right 
serve to create difficulties for the accumulation process. The clearest examples of this type of 
inadvertency are to be found in the Anglo-Saxon heartlands of neoliberalism: the US and 
Britain. Since the late sixties Republicans have been increasingly reliant on communities of 
fundamentalist Christian believers, whose activism allows them to be mobilized for voting 
purposes. But this religious core vote, or at any rate their leadership, naturally also demand 
the implementation of policies in return for their support. The problem is not only one for the 
Republicans in that the extremism of fundamentalist Christianity may alienate the electoral 
‘middle-ground’ on which the result of American elections increasingly depend, but that 
politicians are constrained from undertaking policies which may be necessary for the long-
term health of American capitalism.. 
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 But it is not only religious belief which can cause difficulties for US capital; so to can 
overt anti-migrant racism as evident in the campaign of and support for Donald Trump.2 One 
concrete example of this is the Tea Party-inspired Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and 
Citizen Protection Act–HB56 as it is usually known – which was passed by the State 
legislature in June 2011 – making it illegal not to carry immigration papers and preventing 
anyone without documents from receiving any provisions from the state, including water 
supply. The law was intended to prevent and reverse illegal immigration by Hispanics, but 
the effect was to cause a mass departure of workers from the many agricultural businesses 
which relied on these workers to form the bulk of their labor force. But the effects went 
deeper. Before the law was introduced it was estimated that 4.2% of the workforce or 95,000 
people were undocumented but paying $130.3 million in state and local taxes. Their 
departure from the state or withdrawal to the informal economy threatened to reduce the size 
of the local economy by $40 million. Moreover, employers had to spend more money on 
screening prospective employees, on Human Resources staff to check paperwork, and on 
insuring for potential legal liabilities from inadvertent breaches of the law (Immigration 
Policy Centre, 2011).  
 The British Conservative Party has encountered similar problems to the Republicans, 
but in their case in relation to Europe. The imperial nationalism unleashed by the 
Conservatives before 1997 in relation to ‘Europe’, was not because the EU was in any sense 
hostile to neoliberalism, but as an ideological diversion from the failure of neoliberalism to 
transform the fortunes of British capital. The nationalism invoked for this purpose now places 
a major obstacle for British politicians and state managers who want to pursue a strategy of 
greater European integration, however rational that may be from their perspective, and the 
longer-term interests of significant, if not the dominant, fractions of British capital. A 2013 
British Chambers of Commerce poll of 4,387 companies showed only 18 percent agreeing 
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that full withdrawal from the EU could have a positive impact, while a majority of 64 percent 
supported remaining inside the EU while repatriating some powers (Vina, 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, the real source of anti-EU feeling is small business, for who increased 
regulation and improved worker rights, even of a minimal sort, pose a far greater threat to 
their profit margins than they do to large corporations (Mail on Sunday, 2013).  
 The key beneficiary of the anti-European hysteria has been UKIP and its success has 
in turn emboldened the right within the Conservative Party, even though the policies 
associated with both are incoherent. These contradictions may not matter in terms of the 
political struggle for power. UKIP has given a focus to a range of concerns in the shape of a 
quasi-imaginary institution called the ‘European Union’, in a similar way that the Tea Party 
did in the shape of another quasi-imaginary institution called ‘government’; the main 
difference is that in the case of the former, the institution is foreign, rather than domestic, the 
crime of local elites being their compliance and ‘betrayal’ or ‘sell-out’. The basis of at least 
part of its popular support is, however, drawn from a comparable constituency. The authors 
of the most thorough study of the party note that one might expect that ‘at a time of falling 
real incomes and unprecedented economic uncertainty, voters from poorer and more insecure 
groups should rally behind the party who can offer them the best prospect for economic 
support and assistance’, not ‘a party with a barely coherent or credible economic policy, no 
track record in helping the disadvantaged  and a libertarian activist base  who openly favour  
free markets over the support for the disadvantaged’. The explanation for this ‘paradox’ is 
depressing but relatively simple: ‘UKIP voters, who are by some margin the most politically 
disaffected group in the electorate, have lost faith in the ability of traditional politics to solve 
their everyday problems and have instead turned their anger towards groups they feel are 
responsible for the decline in their standards of living and their loss of control over their 
lives’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 277). 
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The Racialized Effects of Neoliberalism, the Politics of Whiteness and the Far-Right 
Neoliberalism does not, however, lead to increased levels of racism solely through labour 
market mechanisms which can be turned into grievances by the far-right. In spite of the 
claims of its ideological cheerleaders that neoliberalism is, and promotes, a ‘post-racial,’ 
‘race-neutral’ or ‘colour-blind’ form of political economy based on individualized subjects 
(see Friedman, 1962; Omi and Winant, 2014: 211-44) stripped of culturalized identities 
pursuing competitive market behaviour, the pathology of racism continues to be reproduced 
out of the social regime of neoliberal capitalism. The racialized effects of neoliberal political 
economy, particularly its attack on ‘welfare-dependency’ and a ‘bloated state’, are evident 
through popular and racialized stereotypes of the welfare recipient, as well as the iniquitous 
consequences of the privatization of welfare provision and reductions in public outlays that 
has also had a disproportionate impact on ethnic minority communities. In addition to this, 
the management of migration to fuel the neoliberal economy that rests on racialized 
categories of acceptable and unacceptable immigrants and refugees (Fekete, 1998/99; 2001 
Fekete, et al, 2014) and the development of a criminal and penal regime that has worked 
hand-in-hand with neoliberal political economy with markedly racialized effects, most 
notoriously evident in the incarceration rates of African-Americans, their deaths in custody 
and as a result of generalized police violence (Peck, 2010; Wacquant, 2010).3   
 Neoliberalism, then, has helped create the conditions for the re-emergence of the far-
right whilst, at the same time, the far-right has focused on attacking what it sees as the 
symptoms of neoliberalism through racializing its social, political and economic effects. The 
racism of the contemporary far-right also fits more easily with the ideological assumptions of 
neoliberalism because the dominant currents of the far-right no longer officially propagate the 
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‘blood and soil’ racism of their predecessors. Neoliberal racism and far-right racism can, 
then, be conceptualized as a new form of racism; what scholars have variously labelled as 
‘new racism’ (Barker, 1981), ‘neo-racism’ (Balibar, 1991a), ‘cultural racism’ (Hall and du 
Gay, 1996) and/or ‘xeno-racism’ (Fekete, 2009: 19-42). Racism in this sense serves to 
facilitate certain types of hierarchical and exclusionary social orders based on what are 
regarded as the inherent qualities or deficiencies in oppressed groups (Seymour, 2010; 
Camfield, 2016). It connects to a longer-term idea that also centred on cultural or 
behavioural, rather than purely physiological traits, as in the racist depictions of white but 
Catholic Irish as ‘non-whites’ in the nineteenth century Anglosphere. From this, racial 
difference and thus racist exclusions and discriminations derive from claims as to  the 
incompatible cultural practices of ethnic and cultural minorities with respect to a ‘national’ or 
‘indigenous’ culture. Racial exclusions are justified but not on explicit claims around white 
superiority (the ‘old racism’) but rather because the behaviour of certain groups–above all, 
Muslims–is regarded as at odds with understandings of the basis upon which social solidarity 
and citizenship rest (see Fekete, 2004, 2014; Müller-Uri and Opratko, 2014; Seymour, 
2010).4  
 The epistemological and ontological dimensions of neoliberalism as a social regime 
have had serious consequences for the continuation of underlying racist practices. As David 
Goldberg notes, one of the most significant consequences of neoliberalism has been what he 
calls the ‘privatization of race’ as a social and political issue, particularly in the United States 
(Goldberg, 2009: 337-41). For Goldberg, this trend is an element within the generalized logic 
of privatization. It combines the upholding of the privileges accruing to holders of private 
property with the evacuation of the social and democratic presence across large sections of 
civil society that had developed as a consequence of social and political struggle in previous 
decades (Goldberg, 2009: 338, 341). The neoliberal reconfiguration of the state, then, has 
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seen it – the state’s – role in, and ability to facilitate race equality and addressing ongoing 
racisms be increasingly de-legitimized and scaled down.5 
 The upshot of these developments is that existing racial exclusions and racist effects 
across the private sphere are foreclosed from any democratic or legal scrutiny. Goldberg 
(2009: 337; see also Davis, 2007) makes specific reference to the US case; here, the 
termination of affirmative action programmes, as well as the racialized effects of dismantling 
the democratic state through the privatization of public services and cuts in public sector 
employment has had disproportionate effects on ethnic minorities. These developments have 
been taken advantage of by the far-right because they have effectively provided a structural 
and ‘mainstream’ legitimation for its racism. The far-right has been able to claim that a series 
of outcomes–including the marginalization and non-assimilation of ethnic minorities, 
dependence on the welfare state and the disproportionate numbers of non-whites in prison–
are because of inherent cultural identities and practices within such groups. The absence of 
public authorities and norms subject to democratic scrutiny and consultation, together with 
the new ideological common-sense that the neoliberal state and its civil society cheerleaders 
articulate, mean that causal explanations for ‘social problems’ such as economic 
marginalization are increasingly based on cultural identities and practices connected to 
particular racialized groups. Culture is left as the only explanatory residue for apparent 
behavioural traits that do not conform to a ‘meritocratic’ neoliberal subjectivity (Roberts and 
Mahtani, 2010; Giroux, 2008). The resultant meeting of neoliberalism and the far-right may 
not be the avowed intention of advocates and ideologues for the former, but it is the 
inescapable political outcome. 
 But neoliberalism also problematizes and reinforces an identity of whiteness. Thus, 
the unspoken assumption – for neoliberals at least – is that because identities around class, 
gender and politics have been erased as explanations for social patterns and pathologies, the 
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default of ‘whiteness’ remains as the explanatory variable determining membership of, 
participation in, and contribution to society (see Bhattacharyya et al (2002); Davis, 2007; 
Jensen and Howard-Wagner, 2015). This means that membership of and participation in 
society is inscribed with unspoken and publicly-hidden racialized attributes of whites as that 
racial grouping identified with those who deserve entitlement to social welfare benefits (see 
Jensen and Howard-Wagner, 2015).6 If what Goldberg calls ‘presumptive whiteness’ (2008a: 
1714) identifies those deserving of social welfare support, some scholars (Mudde, 2007) have 
seen it as connected with the far-right’s ‘nativism’ with regard to the character and focus of 
the welfare state.  
An ideological opening appears for the far-right because this permits the articulation 
of an explicitly racialized conception of citizenship into the neoliberal ‘social vacuum’ that is 
a consequence of the neoliberal project of reconfiguring the social democratic state whereby 
the institutions and spaces – and their associated anti-racist imaginaries – that were formerly 
committed to combating racism have either been eliminated or radically downgraded. It is not 
then that neoliberalism causes racism (Pitcher, 2012)  in the sense that racism is an organic 
dimension of it,7 but rather that neoliberalism is grounded on a collective socio-economic 
insecurity that helps facilitate a revival of pre-existing racialized imaginaries of solidarity, as 
one of the remaining political-institutional frameworks of solidarity left intact within 
neoliberal politics, and also because of the way in which nationalist ideological tropes have 
been utilized by political parties committed to implementing neoliberal policies as a way of 
mobilizing a ‘democratic’ constituency for it –Reagan and Thatcher being exemplars here.  
 On a number of different levels, then, neoliberalism has racialized effects that have 
assisted the distinct ‘oppositional’ and ‘populist’ politics of the far-right. Thus, whilst (some) 
immigrants are welcomed and encouraged by neoliberal regimes, at the same time the social 
policies associated with neoliberalism’s dismantling of the social democratic welfare state 
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and its articulation of new forms of individualized subjectivities have served to reinforce and 
rearticulate racisms that feedback into the long-standing views of the far-right. These are 
revitalized in a context of socio-economic crises that takes on a racialized appearance both in 
terms of its source (the international/non-native) and what appears, according to the far-right 
demagoguery, to be accentuated by neoliberal immigration. It is precisely through this 
contradictory prism that the far-right appears as an oppositional force to neoliberalism whilst, 
at the same time, assisting the underlying racialized assumptions that fuel neoliberal political 
economy.      
 
 
The Redrawing of the Democratic Political Sphere, Internationalization and the Far-
Right 
Neoliberalism was always suspicious of democracy and, above all, of interventions by 
institutions reflecting the collective will of democratic citizens on the operation of the market 
economy (Hayek, 2001: 73-4). One of the most significant political objectives of neoliberalism 
has therefore been to reconfigure, institutionally, and reconstitute, politically, the workings of 
democratic structures and processes and, in particular, how they relate to the organization and 
workings of the economy (see Bonefeld and Kiely in this symposium; Brown, 2015; Dardot 
and Laval, 2014; Harvey, 2005; Peck et al, 2012; Plehwe et al, 2006). Such goals have been 
significantly achieved across much of the liberal democratic world. Assisted by the collapse 
of historical communism and the subsequent fracturing and disorientation of the left, the era 
of mass democratic politics appears to in terminal decline (Mair, 2013). How do such 
developments relate to the far-right and to what extent do such changes facilitate the 
development of far-right politics? In many respects these tendencies towards 
internationalization and technocracy over key areas of public policy and the resultant 
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emptying out of democratic politics from ever-expanding areas of social life have provided a 
key source of far-right mobilizations (Saull, 2015c).  
 Internally, the increasing interchangeability of mainstream political parties gives the 
far-right an opening to voters by positioning themselves as outside the consensus in relation 
to social policy (Cole 2015: 222-223). Magnus Marsdal notes the decline in Danish public 
anger between the introduction of pension cuts by the Social Democrats in 1998 and the 
General Election in 2001 because of the almost total agreement between different parties and 
commentators about their necessity: “This depoliticizing of economics leads to the 
politicizing of everything else” (Marsdal, 2013: 51; original emphasis).  
 Externally, the institutional framing of these developments within an organization like 
the EU has also been influential in conditioning the rise of the far-right, particularly in recent 
years within the context of responding to the 2008 global economic crisis and the subsequent 
Eurozone ‘sovereign debt’ crisis from 2010. Simply put, in a context of economic crisis 
involving an institution – the EU – with a severe democratic deficit where such international 
responses have served to entrench and expand neoliberalism with    (see Mirowski, 2014; 
Peck et al, 2012), the political opportunities for the far-right have been propitious.  
 Much of the liberal commentary on the political responses to the Eurozone crisis has 
emphasized the populist dimensions (see Mudde, 2015) of the ‘anti-system’ movements and 
parties that have emerged, including leftist currents such as Podemos in Spain and Syriza in 
Greece. But an equally significant and deep-rooted ‘anti-system’ response has been the 
revival of the far-right as the dominant anti-EU or Eurosceptic current. This is because of its 
ability to exert populist and demagogic pressure on the forces of the traditional right. In part 
this is also because the far-right attacks European integration, but does not threaten property 
rights and some of the associated core principles that neoliberalism has championed in recent 
years in the way that the radical left appears to. The point here then is that far-right can be 
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seen to operate as an ‘internal opposition’ or outlet of anger, insecurity and grievance from 
within the neoliberal political-economic universe. Through its populist agitation and 
demagogic posturing that seeks to involve and offer a ‘democratic’ outlet for the masses it 
poses a threat to the neoliberal consensus, which seeks to limit if not eliminate the scope and 
role of democratic publics on the workings of the market economy (see Davidson, 2015; 
Saull, 2015b). However, its focus on the spatial and institutional dimensions of neoliberalism 
means it does not fundamentally challenge the core premises of neoliberalism. The far-right, 
then, could–and should be–seen as a consequence of the crisis produced from neoliberalism 
in the way that fascism was a product of the crisis of state-monopoly capitalism after 1918 
(Saull, 2015a).  
 Drawing on the work of Wolfgang Streeck (2014) we can also identify how the 
institutional architecture of the Eurozone and its connection to neoliberal financialization in 
particular, centred on the ‘supranational sovereignty’ of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
has come to play a central role in the revival of a politics infused with a symbolism and 
language connected to the far right. The moves towards adopting formal arrangements of 
central bank (political) independence can be seen as one of the most significant triumphs of 
‘neoliberal common sense’. The termination of the democratic oversight of these institutions 
and their operations could also be seen as reflecting the capture of a significant arm of the 
state by the interests of the finance-capitalist class. Indeed, whilst not referring specifically to 
financial neoliberalism (nor the EU), the words of former Chair of the US Federal Reserve, 
Alan Greenspan from September 2007 provide a sense of how ruling class policy makers and 
ideologues have seen such developments: ‘[w]e are fortunate that, thanks to globalization, 
policy decisions in the US have been largely replaced by global market forces. National 
security aside, it hardly makes any difference who will be the next president. The world is 
governed by market forces’ (cited in Streeck, 2014: 85).   
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 Greenspan’s claim is, obviously, an exaggeration but it does point to something 
significant about the relationship between democratic processes and institutions in the key 
decisions concerning the economy. National economies have become much more closely 
inter-connected and integrated, especially so in the context of the EU and the Eurozone, and 
this has engendered elite-level diplomatic bargaining and the construction of international 
technocratic regimes to manage these increasingly complex and inter-connected networks of 
economic relations. So, while capitalist classes are still unevenly connected to one or other 
national jurisdiction the conditions for their collective reproduction are increasingly set and 
determined in institutional frameworks at the EU or Eurozone level that are largely off-limits 
to any democratic oversight from European publics.  
 Consequently, the social and political connections between the dominant fractions of 
(neoliberal) capital and subaltern classes across the mature capitalist economies are 
fundamentally different to previous eras. Socially, it means that the reproduction of dominant 
class fractions is much less tied to the specific national economies and class relations where 
they happen to be domiciled. Politically, it means that the political-legal and institutional 
framework that upholds private property rights and core market rules are determined in 
institutional settings and via legal arrangements largely outside the oversight of democratic 
structures which are still substantively rooted in nation-state locales. In contrast to the past, 
capitalist classes are, then, much less dependent on right and far-right ‘democratic’ 
mobilizations from below or constructing cross-class alliances to ward off leftist democratic 
threats and challenges as they were in the past. And as demonstrated above in section one, 
because of the continuing national-focus and institutional location of democratic possibilities 
within a national-demos, this can result in contradictions and antagonisms emerging between 
the class interests of the dominant fractions of neoliberal capital and far-right political 
27 
 
articulations that continue to reify the national as the singular ontological space for political 
deliberation and authority. 
 The question of the relationship between the forces of the far-right and the capitalist 
class – or at least its dominant/internationalizing fractions – is beyond the scope of this article 
(but see Davidson, 2015; Saull, 2015c). What we can say, however, is that the way in which 
the European/Eurozone neoliberal economy is organized in spatial, institutional and political 
terms provides a particular political and mobilizing advantage to the politics of the far-right. 
As Streeck highlights, within the context of crises of neoliberal financialization and their 
management or resolution, the relations between ‘creditor’ and ‘debtor’ states is increasingly 
played-out within nationalist political language and imaginaries. In Streeck’s words, ‘[t]he 
upshot is an astonishingly popular reformulation of politics of public debt in nationalist terms 
with huge demagogic potential, as well as rapid renationalization and nationalist moralization 
of international political discourse while respect for claims to national sovereignty is made 
dependent on a country’s good behaviour vis-à-vis the global financial markets and 
international organizations and its observance of the rules of conduct that they prescribe’ 
(Streeck, 2014: 92).  
 Both the external relations, as played out in public diplomacy and domestic political 
posturing and the depiction of domestic polities and societies, emphasize a national(ist) 
homogeneity to the participants, as highlighted in the depiction of relations as between 
‘German’ or ‘Finnish’ creditors dealing with ‘Greek’ or ‘Irish’ debtors. This serves to gloss 
over and obscure the fundamental class relations produced by neoliberalism within these 
‘politically homogenous’ nation-states. The language of politics especially as it plays out 
over the media-sphere rests, then, on the sine qua non of a far-right political sensibility, that 
politics is based upon and political identity constituted by nationalist narratives. The 
significance of this is that such language and sentiment has also infected much of the left, as 
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evidenced by much of the rhetoric associated with Syriza’s domestic political strategy after 
securing office in early 2015.  
 Neoliberal austerity provides the ‘grist to the mill’ in lubricating a politics that 
provides a structural opportunity for the far-right given the nationalist/xenophobic/populist 
framing upon which the politics of financial crisis and austerity is played out within. Given 
the way that class differentials are obscured as a necessary basis for neoliberalism and its 
reconstitution out of crisis the far-right provides an important source of popular mobilization 
and domestic political legitimacy for the maintenance of the social regime of neoliberalism 
and for the politics of crises within both debtor and creditor contexts. Whilst in the context of 
the Eurozone crisis much of the electoral landscape has been altered by the emergence of and 
fluctuating support for a number of ‘populist’ or ‘anti-political’ sentiments – see the Five-Star 
Movement in Italy in particular – we can see political forces with a common far-right 
dimension (based on welfare nativism, xenophobia, anti-liberal/cosmopolitanism and anti-
Muslim racism) securing significant sources of support across a range of Western states from 
the US – now evident in ‘Trumpism’ following on from the ‘Tea Party’ – to Switzerland, 
France the UK and even Germany with the Alternative fuer Deutschland party (Economist, 
2016; Martin, 2016; New York Times, 2016). Whether or not these political currents become 
a more permanent feature of the political landscape is too early to say but what does appear to 
be the case is that within the political confines of nation-state democratic imaginaries and in a 
context of widespread socio-economic insecurity and discredited established elites a ‘quasi-
fascist’ (Eley, 2015) moment appears to be upon us.   
We need to be careful in exaggerating the causal relationships in facilitating a politics 
of the far-right: as Syriza and Podemos have demonstrated, a populist platform does not 
automatically produce a far-right. Nevertheless, the structural-institutional imbalance 
between an internationally organized and managed neoliberal capitalism with a democratic 
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political imaginary confined to the nation-state serves to make it much easier for the far-right 
to prosper. When this is combined with the idea of ‘international solidarity’ as requiring the 
sacrifices and pain of austerity, i.e. as a necessary almost public humiliation of a people it is 
easy to see why a populism infused with a nationalist orientation gains significant political 
traction.  
 
 
Conclusions 
Neoliberalism does not currently need the far-right in the way that a number of national 
capitalist classes needed ‘political rescue’ by fascism during the inter-war era; but both 
significant dimensions of neoliberal ideology and the consequences of its operationalization 
are closely aligned with the politics of the far-right. Further, whilst the far-right 
problematizes the reproduction of the neoliberal socio-economic regime it only does so in 
quite specific and limited ways. In particular, it is the spatial and (international) institutional 
framing of neoliberalism which is particularly significant in the context of the EU.  
 The significance of the revival of the far-right, then, should not be under-estimated as 
it has come to exercise a significant populist current contributing to a new ‘common sense’ 
associated with the reconfiguration of Western welfare states and influenced in more recent 
debates about responses to migration. Indeed, it is in this latter case where the ‘embrace’ has 
been particularly contradictory. In general, capital in the West favours the free movement of 
labour but it prefers that labour to be cheap and insecure. In so far as far-right arguments 
against migrants help to maintain these levels of insecurity then they perform an unintended 
service for the system as a whole. However – and this is where the contradiction begins – if 
the far-right was ever to achieve its actual goals of preventing migration then it would, in an 
equally unintended way, perform a far greater disservice, as our earlier examples taken from 
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the USA and UK suggest. In immediate policy terms for the left, the implications are that 
attitudes towards the EU should not take as their starting point a simple reversal of the far-
right position – the far right oppose the EU, therefore we must support it – but begin instead 
from what is central to capital, which in this case is the role of the EU in maintaining the 
neoliberal order.        
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1 See the work of Frank (2005) for a discussion of the US case and Rydgren (2014) for 
European cases. 
2 Trump rallies have been dominated by chants from his audience of ‘build the wall’ that refer 
to Trump’s promise, if elected President, to build a wall on the US-Mexican border to prevent 
migrants from Mexico crossing the border, as well as deport the estimated ten million 
undocumented workers resident in the US.  
3 As Soss et al (2011: 295) note, ‘[t]he state’s carceral ‘right hand’ has risen in importance; 
welfare discourses and procedures are increasingly criminalized; and welfare and criminal 
justice operations now function as integrated elements of a single system for managing 
marginal populations.’ 
4 It is important to note here that such culturally-determined racist exclusions are not the 
exclusive prerogative of white or European political contexts. In India, the politics of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are closely aligned with what can only be seen as racist attitudes 
towards non-Hindu minority populations and Muslims in particular (see Ahmad, 2015; Bose, 
2009).    
5 The point here is not to overlook the racisms within the structures and processes of the 
social-democratic state as if the post-war welfare state offers an idealized past because the  
post-war welfare state was always a racialized one and especially so in the United States (see 
Quadagno, 1994; Virdee, 2014:98-121) for how best to combat racism, but to, instead, 
recognize how the reconfiguration of the state across liberal democracies and, in the US and 
Britain in particular, has ended up dismantling those spaces and resources within the state 
that anti-racist organizations and campaigns could draw on as part of a legitimate public 
discourse for politicizing racism as a political concern requiring public action. It was out of 
this context that a number of successful anti-racist campaigns emerged and bore fruit through 
the 1960s and 1970s in terms of housing, employment and political rights involving anti-
racist mobilizations outside of the state but in dialogue with and taking advantage of spaces 
and resources within the state, limited though these were. Very few, if any of these spaces or 
resources exist anymore and it has been the epistemological and ontological assumptions of 
neoliberalism in thought and action that has provided the source of these changes and, with it, 
a structural impediment to effectively combatting ongoing racisms. Thanks to John 
Holmwood and Robbie Shilliam for insisting on clarifying this issue. 
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6 This connects to a deeper logic of racism that has come to be called ‘the wages of 
whiteness’ first identified by W. E. B. Du Bois (1965: 700) where he discussed the racism of 
Southern workers in the post-reconstruction United States, ‘the white group of laborers, while 
they receive a low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological 
wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white. They 
were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and 
the best schools.’ 
7 Notwithstanding the fundamental issue of the initial act of racial dispossession which was 
foundational to the creation of a global capitalist economy from which neoliberalism 
emerged. 
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